Prolonged stand-off

HISTORICALLY, India-Pakistan relatio­­ns have moved within a narrow bandwidth, mostly between a looming conflict and an ominous peace. A sense of tension and expectancy was always in the air, but dialogue was never taken off the table. But the current state of relations is unique. The two countries are simply not on speaking terms. There is no dialogue, nor a desire for it.
How did we get here? Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Pakistan policy began with high-visibility peace overtures, including the invitation to his swearing-in, and the theatrics of visiting Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in December 2015. He knows the power of the visual for modern media. After exciting the international media about prospects of peace in the region and conjuring an illusion of Modi as a peacemaker, he pulled the plug on the “peace initiative” by using the January 2016 Pathankot incident as an excuse. The move at once highlighted the militancy issue and Pakistan as a spoiler, and stitched the two. The accusation became India’s standard playbook in its campaign to isolate Pakistan.
India, which had already become America’s crucial partner in balancing China, was now an important ally in containing Pakistan. Supporting India in its regional hegemonic ambitions and its policy of making terrorism the core issue between India and Pakistan suited Washington. America’s own relationship with Pakistan was becoming adversarial because of Islamabad’s strategic relationship with China, unhelpful role in the failing Afghanistan war, and the alleged association with terrorism about which the US had its own concerns.
With Indian and American policies on Pakistan beating to each other’s rhythm, the forward policy of PM Modi’s first term became the aggressive nationalism of the second term. In a clear break from India’s past defensiveness, he responded militarily to the Pulwama incident. It worked domestically as Pulwama and the earlier incidents involving militants had triggered an enormous emotional response from the Indian citizenry, providing strong support for Modi’s national security policies. And abroad, it helped highlight Pakistan as having provoked the Indian military response and thus being responsible for inciting the risk of conflict in the region, a nuclear flashpoint.
The Indian PM’s muscular policies were given a strategic framework when S. Jaishankar became the external affairs minister in 2019. Besides dovetailing with America’s geopolitics and India’s regional ambitions, the Pakistan policy gave India a card against Beijing, and was a useful tool in electoral politics. And by doubling down on Pakistan’s diminished international status, India managed to dictate its own view of Kashmir to the West and even to Pakistan’s friends in the Middle East, muting their response to Kashmir’s annexation.
India’s Kashmir strategy seems to be working. But the policy of isolating Pakistan has reached a dead end. Trying to isolate Pakistan and not talking had made sense, but why is India still not talking? India knows Pakistan would insist on talking about Kashmir, which they do not want. It wants to convince the Kashmiris that Pakistan is no longer relevant to their future and they better reconcile to the new realities on the ground.
Some Indian scholars feel India is following a ‘minimalist’ approach towards Pakistan, getting involved only when absolutely necessary like securing the Feb 2021 ceasefire. Limited relations, they believe, provide stability. At least they keep one side of the border calm so that India can concentrate on relations with China.
In any case the dilemma remains how to resume the dialogue. India has maintained that terrorism and talks do not go together. Thou­­gh this is not really a precondition, it puts the onus of seeking the dialogue on Pakistan. How­ever, Pakistan will not talk unless India’s Aug 5, 2019 actions are reversed. But Jaishankar has recently reiterated that “So far as Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, Article 370 is done”.
How to break the deadlock? India might at some point restore Kashmir’s status. It would not change its control of the occupied territory but might give Pakistan a reason to resume talks, provided both sides come to a conclusion that it is time to do so. India knows Pakistan wants trade more than it does. And India may have its own reasons to talk.
There is hesitancy on both sides for now. India faces neither an incentive nor a compulsion to talk, and Pakistan may feel — given India’s constraints on the relationship — the benefits will be limited and not worth the political cost. So the status quo continues which benefits India and does not hurt Pakistan. Only strong reasons for dialogue on both sides will move the needle.
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor Georgetown University and Visiting Senior Research Fellow National University of Singapore.
Published in Dawn, September 11th, 2024